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Role and Responsibilities of Agents in
Protecting Taxpayers Under AEoI
PHILIP BAKER QC
Field Court Tax Chambers  
3 Field Court, Gray’s Inn  
London WC1R 5EP
Visiting Professor, Oxford University  
e-mail: pb@fieldtax.com
FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Role of Agents in AEoI
pb@fieldtax.com
• Who are the agents:
• General Data Protection Regulation:
• Art 4 - Definitions
• (7) ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body  
which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of  
personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union  
or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be  provided 
for by Union or Member State law;
• (8) ‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller;
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Role of Agents in AEoI
pb@fieldtax.com
• Who are the agents:
• Art 4 - Definitions
• (9) ‘recipient’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or another body, to  
which the personal data are disclosed, whether a third party or not. However, public  
authorities which may receive personal data in the framework of a particular inquiry in  
accordance with Union or Member State law shall not be regarded as recipients; the  
processing of those data by those public authorities shall be in compliance with the  
applicable data protection rules according to the purposes of the processing;
• (10) ‘third party’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or body other than  
the data subject, controller, processor and persons who, under the direct authority of the  
controller or processor, are authorised to process personal data;
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Role of Agents in AEoI
pb@fieldtax.com
• Who are the agents:
• General Data Protection Regulation:
• Art 4 – Definitions
• (22) ‘supervisory authority concerned’ means a supervisory authority which is concerned by  
the processing of personal data because: (a) the controller or processor is established on the  
territory of the Member State of that supervisory authority; (b) data subjects residing in the  
Member State of that supervisory authority are substantially affected or likely to be  
substantially affected by the processing; or (c) a complaint has been lodged with that  
supervisory authority;
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Role of Agents in AEoI
pb@fieldtax.com
• Who are the agents for AEoI?
• Financial Institutions
• Sending Revenue Authorities
• Receiving Revenue Authorities
• OECD as Operator of Clearing House
• Supervisory authorities
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Role of Agents in AEoI
pb@fieldtax.com
• General Data Protection Regulation
• Article 79 Right to an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor
• 1.Without prejudice to any available administrative or non-judicial remedy, including the right to  
lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority pursuant to Article 77, each data subject shall  
have the right to an effective judicial remedy where he or she considers that his or her rights  
under this Regulation have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her personal data  
in non-compliance with this Regulation.
• Article 82 Right to compensation and liability
• 1.Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of  
this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for  
the damage suffered.
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Role of Agents in AEoI
pb@fieldtax.com
• Possible criminal liability
• Article 83 General conditions for imposing administrative fines
• 1.Each supervisory authority shall ensure that the imposition of administrative  
fines pursuant to this Article in respect of infringements of this Regulation  
referred to in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 shall in each individual case be effective,  
proportionate and dissuasive.
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Role of Agents in AEoI
pb@fieldtax.com
• Article 84 Penalties
• 1.Member States shall lay down the rules on other penalties applicable to  
infringements of this Regulation in particular for infringements which are not  
subject to administrative fines pursuant to Article 83, and shall take all measures  
necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Such penalties shall be effective,  
proportionate and dissuasive.
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The missing link
BARCELONA 2017
Paul van der Smitte
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References and
disclaimer
Paul R. van der Smitte LL.M, MA  
Strategic advisor of the Central Liaison Office  
Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration
Phd-candidate at the University of Utrecht and the Complutense University of Madrid
Is Directive 2010/24/EU more effective and efficient than its predecessors? To what extent have Member States safeguard the  
enforcement of the provisions of the Recovery Directive in their national legal orders?”
This presentation reflects my own observations and in no way represents the views of the Netherlands Tax and Customs  
Administration nor the Netherlands Ministry of Finance.
If you refer to (parts or images of) this presentation I would appreciate it if you use the references that are in the  slides.
Tax and Customs Administration of the Netherlands
Central Liaison Office Almelo
Doctoral advisor: Professor Linda Senden Doctoral advisor: Professor Amparo Grau Ruiz
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The objectives for obtaining information
Why are we exchanging information?
International Agreements on Automatic Exchange of  
Information
Developments
FACTA, CRS, BEPS EU
Audits, Levying
Analysis Pre-filled tax  
returns
Opportunities
Tax Collection?
Audit and Levying
Information is mainly used for the  
purpose of audits and levying, i.e.  
contra information, avoidance of  
double taxation, tax evasion and tax  
fraud.
Tax collection
Information is limited used for tax  
collection purposes. What about  
payment thinking?
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Analytics - Behavioural sciences - Organisation 
Audit/levy
Assessment
Uneconomic  
to pursue
Payment term on  
assessment
Postponement  
of payment/  
Payment  
arrangement
Reminderor
warning letter
Instrument
permitting
enforcement
Seizure  
order
Legal tools  
(such as  
Seizure and  
selling)
Paid
Write off  
(full amount or  
the remainder)
Tolerance/
Coulance
Compliant  
Payment on time
Recovery of tax claims  
(enforced or coercive tax collection)
Tax collection
(voluntary payment)
Mutual assistance in the recovery of tax
claims (or direct approach)
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ay
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t
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g
Due date Tax gap
Non-Compliant
Payment too late (in default)
Costs and interest collecting taxes
End-Stages
Van den Bogaard, R. & Van der Smitte, P. (2014). Developed for OECD Report “Working smarter in debt management.
Tax Collection Chain
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WHAT DO YOU THINK PAYMENT  
THINKING IS?
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The auditor The inspector The tax collector
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Questions?  
Comments?
Paul van der Smitte L.LM, MA
+31 6 1860 4741
pr.van.der.smitte@belastingdienst.nl
I am happy to  
help you!
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International Administrative Cooperation in Tax Matters  
and Tax Governance
Barcelona, 26th January 2017
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Prof. María Amparo GRAU RUIZ  
PI CertificaRSE project (DER2015-65374-R MINECO-FEDER)
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OUTLINE
OVERVIEW
Who and what goals? Objectives and means Where to gather?
TAX GOVERNANCE:
Why UN? Processes of revitalization and strengthening  
Leadership role : promotion of international cooperation
“for (sustainable) development” Only? A matter of sense or sensibilities?
TAX COOPERATION
Work and structure at the UN  
Changes needed to reach new goals ?
FINAL REMARKS
Taxation as instrument De jure or de facto?
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TAX GOVERNANCE
The United Nations in global economic governance [Resolution 67/289 adopted by the  
General Assembly on 9 July 2013, A/RES/67/289]
IMP. Achieve internationally agreed development goals (urgent global
challenges in increasingly interconnected world)
=> inclusive, transparent & effective multilateral system
• UN = universality + continued commitment to strengthen effectiveness &
efficiency
• intergovernmental groupings that make policy recommendations/take policy  
decisions (i.e. G20) + multilateral institutions
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A. Grau 23UB, 26 -I-2017
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Increased interaction (flexible and regular) => benefits (transparency, coherence, mutual  
understanding)
Central role of the UN system providing an intergovernmental forum
(international conferences & summits)
+ participation of private sector, civil society and academia
• GA authority on global matters of concern to the international community, as set out in  
the Charter
• ECOSOC principal body for policy review, policy dialogue & recommendations on issues  
of economic, environmental and social development
[Economic, Environment, Social, and Governance criteria = non revenue goal of the tax
systems]
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A. Grau 24UB, 26 -I-2017
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Substantive discussions with World Bank, IMF, WTO, UNCTAD: enhance the coherence
and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems (ensuring
openness, fairness and inclusiveness)
(Informal briefings -President of GA practice: inviting appropriate representatives to an interactive
dialogue with the membership of the Assembly. Participation of the Secretary-General in summits
of intergovernmental groupings)
IMP. broadening and strengthening the participation of developing countries in  
international economic decision-making and norm-setting
(i.e. steps taken on the reform of the governance structures, quotas and voting rights of the  
Bretton Woods institutions)
Deliver more EFFECTIVE, CREDIBLE, ACCOUNTABLE AND LEGITIMATE institutions
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Need to better incorporate regional and subregional organizations and arrangements  
into the framework of global governance
Imp. of integration processes for economic governance and development
in pursuit of the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Encourages the regional commissions, to support and cooperate with them  
in their efforts to promote sustainable development
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UB, 26 -I-2017 ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A. Grau 27
TAX COOPERATION
GA: Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 “Transforming our world: the 2030  
Agenda for Sustainable Development” Comprehensive, far-reaching and people-
centred set of universal and transformative Sustainable Development Goals
ECOSOC: Resolution adopted by the Economic and Social Council on 5 October2016,  
29 December 2016 [E/RES/2017/2].
In the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for
Development
Call made for the strengthening of international tax cooperation  
through enhanced dialogue among national tax authorities
and greater coordination of the work of the multilateral bodies  
and relevant regional organizations concerned
giving special attention to the needs of developing countries and countries with  
economies in transition
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In the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development
and the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on  
Development
Request to examine the strengthening of the institutional arrangements to promote
international cooperation in tax matters, including the Committee of Experts
In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for  
Development, Member States
emphasized the importance of inclusive cooperation and dialogue among national tax
authorities
decided to further enhance the Committee’s resources to strengthen its effectiveness and  
operational capacity (frequency and duration of its meetings, engagement the Council  
through the special meeting on international cooperation in tax matters)
Seite 28
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“Starting in 2017, one session of the Committee will be held in New York in the spring and one in Geneva
in the autumn, with the session in New York held back to back with the special meeting of the Council on
international cooperation in tax matters, in order to increase the Committee’s engagement with the
Council with a view to enhancing intergovernmental consideration of tax issues”
Members of the Committee will continue to report directly to the Council
from the fields of tax policy and tax administration  
reflect an adequate equitable geographical distribution  
represent different tax systems
Support the Committee and its subsidiary bodies through the voluntary trust fund
“while each country is responsible for its tax system, it is important to support efforts in  
these areas by strengthening technical assistance and enhancing international cooperation  
and participation in addressing international tax matters”
“It is important for the Committee to enhance its collaboration with other international  
organizations active in the area of international tax cooperation, including the IMF, the World  
Bank and the OECD, and with relevant regional and subregional bodies”
Seite 29
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progress made by the Financing for Development Office of the Department of Economic  
and Social Affairs of the Secretariat in developing, within its mandate, a capacity  
development programme in international tax cooperation aimed at strengthening the  
capacity of the ministries of finance and the national tax authorities in developing  
countries
The 2017 Economic and Social Council forum on financing for development follow-up will  
convene from 22 to 25 May, and will include the special high-level meeting with the  
Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization and the United Nations  
Conference on Trade and Development (E/2017/L.7)
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Resolution 2004/69, the Economic and Social Council decided that the Ad Hoc Groupof  
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters would be renamed the Committee of  
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters with a mandate to:
(a) Keep under review and update as necessary the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention  
between Developed and Developing Countries4 and the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax  
Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries;
(b )Provide a framework for dialogue with a view to enhancing and promoting international tax  
cooperation among national tax authorities;
(c)Consider how new and emerging issues could affect international cooperation in tax matters and  
develop assessments, commentaries and appropriate recommendations;
(d)Make recommendations on capacity-building and the provision of technical assistance to developing  
countries and countries with economies in transition;
(e) Give special attention to developing countries and countries with economies in transition in dealing
with all the above-mentioned issues.
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Secretary-General noted additional gaps inIn his 2012 report (E/2012/8), the
international tax cooperation, such as:
insufficient participation by the least developed countries in tax cooperation forums; a
lack of coordination and cooperation among different providers of technical assistance
and donors; infrequent monitoring and evaluation of technical assistance received by
developing countries that would be needed to formulate lessons learned for future
activities; the often unsatisfactory availability of data on taxation that would assist
developing countries in deciding on policy and administration aspects of their tax laws;
the lack of technical skills in tax administrations, especially as they relate to tackling tax
evasion and avoidance; the lack of information in tax administrations, for example, in the
form of limited access to databases; and the frequent absence of an independent and
competent judicial system outside the tax administration.
Seite 32
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In his 2011 report (E/2011/76), the Secretary-General identified the following three  
options for the purpose of strengthening institutional arrangements to promote  
international tax cooperation, including the Committee:
(a)Strengthening the existing arrangements within the United Nations while retaining
the current format of the Committee of Experts;
(b)Converting the Committee of Experts into an intergovernmental commission on  
international cooperation in tax matters serving as a subsidiary body of the Economic  
and Social Council;
(c)Creating an intergovernmental commission and retaining the current Committee of  
Experts as a subsidiary body of that commission.
Following intense discussions, Member States did not agree on the proposed  
conversion of the Committee of Experts into an intergovernmental commission. In the  
absence of such an entity, organizations active in this area must work together with a  
view to meeting common tax and development goals in the most efficient, responsive  
and participatory ways
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Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters  
Report on the eleventh session (19-23 October 2015)
Economic and Social Council Official Records, 2015 Supplement No. 25
E/2015/45-E/C.18/2015/6
Article 26 (Exchange of information)  
Dispute resolution
Growing recognition of the importance of taxation as a means of mobilization of  
domestic resources (central to sustainable development)
Key areas, including tax administration, policy and incentives, as well as on increasing  
capacity-building and strengthening international cooperation on tax issues
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United Nations Code of Conduct on Cooperation in Combatting International Tax Evasion  
and Avoidance
Update it to incorporate recent developments and to make a united statement in support  
of automatic exchange of information
it would make it clear that the United Nations, as a global body, supported automatic  
exchange of information to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion
The language of the text be revised to produce a text that was not made to appear legally  
binding for countries, given that this would unnecessarily hinder the wide support for  
such a document. Form of a Council resolution, with a draft to be included in the report of  
the Committee
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Dispute resolution balanced paper on arbitration issues for developing countries
(a)Available data on MAP suggests that inventories of unresolved cases are  
increasing
(c)There is likely to be growing discussion of the arbitration issue in tax treaty
negotiations
(d)Also addressing non-binding means of dispute settlement such as conciliation  
and mediation, as well as other binding means such as expert determination
(e) The paper examined some commonly expressed concerns such as the cost of
“loss of sovereignty” and the issue of arbitrators’ independence
(f)Certainty for taxpayers was an important part of the consideration of dispute  
avoidance and resolution in tax matters, but also important were the issues of  
certainty for the revenue administration in terms of source taxation rights preserved  
in a treaty being upheld and certainty for the wider citizenry that multinational  
enterprises and others would pay the appropriate taxes
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The Platform for Collaboration on Tax, bringing together the IMF, OECD, UN and  
WBG, is a significant new development to ensure effective international tax  
cooperation, to help realise the ambitions of Addis
More Information
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd-follow-up/inter-agency-task-force.html
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Unfinished business: HOW TO IMPROVE  
INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION to achieve
sustainable development in its three dimensions  
(economic, social and environmental)
in a balanced and integrated manner?
THANK YOU
 Proyecto CertificaRSE (DER2015-65374-R (MINECO-
FEDER)  https://www.ucm.es/proyecto-certificarse/
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TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CODE INTAX  
MATTERS. THE ROLE OF THE AGENTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE  
COOPERATION IN TAX MATTERS (EU; OECD, FATC, UN,…).
Eva Andrés Aucejo.
Professor of Tax Law. University of Barcelona
The original version of this research was concluded in the  
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation of Amsterdam in  
2015 as a result of a Grant from the Economy and  
“Competitiveness” Spain Ministry (Herrero de Madariaga).
This article is the embryo of a macro research and development  
Project of the Ministry of Economy and “Competitiveness" of Spain  
(Excellence Projects, call 2015), which resulted in funding for four  
years. Reference: (EUDISCOOP) DER 2015-68768-P) <
http://www.idi.mineco.ob.es/portal/site/ MICINN)>.
This paper will be published in a scientific Review included in  
SCOPUS citation database in 2017. The pre-print version of this  
article will be published March 30th, 2017, in the digital repository  
of University of Barcelona.
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TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TAX CODE
1. The main considerations: (matter, Agents,  Regulatory
Instruments)
2. Consequences resulting from the lack of an  International 
tax code in tax matters
3. Regulatory Instruments created by each  different 
Institution or Country (the Agents)
4. Overlapping areas and Loopholes as a  consequence 
of the separate Regulatory  Instruments
5. Proposal of an International tax Code in Tax  Matters
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1. SECTION: The main considerations:
a. Subject or matter: relationships between
tax administrations worldwide
b. Who are the Agents: The Agents are:  
international institutions (OECD, EU, UN,  CIAT, …) 
and Countries (U.S.)
c. Legal Sources: Regulatory instruments of  each one 
of these institutions or countries
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The role of the different agents in the international framework
UNITED  
STATES
OECD  
GLOBAL  
FORUM/  
G-20
United
Nations
European  
Union
LATIN  
AMERICA  
(CIAT)
Nordic  
countries
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2. SECTION: Consequences of the lack of a concept of international tax  
cooperation
a) Shifting from Bilateral treaties to Multilateral instruments (and  returning to
bilateral treaties once again by UK and US policies)
a) The Role of art. 26 MC OECD nowadays
b) The prominence of Soft Law in this matter
c) The power of the UNITED STATES (FATCA)
d) The risks of Economic Globalization
e) The concerns and limitations in Taxpayers’ Rights
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3. SECTION:The regulatory instruments to achieve  
international administrative cooperation in tax matters
•STANDARDS of GLOBAL FORUM ........................................MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT
U.S.
•FATCA ...................................................... MULTILATERAL TREATIES IGA/I -II
O.E.C.D.
•MODEL CONVENTION  OCDE on Income and Capital   .........BILATERAL TREATIES
•(art. 26 MC OECD)
•MODEL CONVENTION EXCHANGE INFORMATION ..............BILATERAL TREATIES (TIEA)
• The Council of Europe/OECD CONVENTION.......................MULTILATERAL TREATY
EUROPEAN UNION
•Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings (only regarding  
Austria)
•Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2010 on administrative cooperation
•Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the
recovery of claims relating to taxes
•Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative  
cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax
•Council Regulation (EU) No 389/2012 of 2 May 2012 on administrative cooperation in  
the field of excise duties and repealing Regulation
•Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council of March 18,  
2015 COM (2015) 136 final on fiscal transparency to combat tax evasion and  
avoidance . RUBIK Agreements
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UNITED NATIONS
• UNITED NATIONS MODEL CONVENTION ON INCOME  AND
CAPITAL
CIAT
• MODEL AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF TAX  
INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN  
CENTRE OF TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (CIAT)
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
• MODEL AGREEMENT ON CO-OPERATION AND  MUTUAL 
ASSISTANCE by the Russian Federation.
NORDIC COUNTRIES
• The NORDIC ASSISTANCE CONVENTION in tax matters
Seite 45
4. SECTION: OVELAPS AND LOOPHOLS
BILATERAL  
TREATY
to avoid double  
Taxation
SPAIN
UE
COMMUNITIE  
S DIRECTIVES
OCDE
Standard
exchange
information
(CRS)The Council of
Europe/OECD  
Multilateral  
Convention of  
Mutual Assistance
ITALY
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4. SECTION: OVELAPS AND LOOPHOLS
FATCA
IGA/1
BILATERAL  
TREATIES
following
OECD MC 1965
SPAINUE
COMMUNITIE  
S DIRECTIVES
OCDE
Standard  
exchange  
information
(Global Forum)
BILATERALTREATIES
(TIEAS) following  
Agreement
of Exchange  
Information 2002
The Council of
Europe/OECD  
Multilateral  
Convention
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• In the near future there will be, at least, three different
but overlapping multilateral systems, dealing with the
issue of automatic exchange of information*
• FATCA (U.S.)
• Common Reporting Standard (OECD)
• Cooperation Directive and others (UE)
(*) Altenburger, 2015: 337
4. Section: OVERLAPPING SYSTEMS
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• EU: The EU Directives 
• OECD/FATCA:
OECE / STANDARD CRS
(Common Reporting Standard)
UNITED STATES
FATCA
Multilateral nature
FATCA has evolved from unilateral
US  legislation to a global 
cooperative agreement
Is based upon taxResidence
Does not refer to citizenship
No withholding tax
Presence of 30% withholding tax
Does not include the minimum US $ 50.000 Pre-
existing accounts under $ 50.000
are  excluded from review 
and reporting
Information is sent and received and information flows 
must  pass through the tax administrations on bothsides
Some FATCA Agreements provide only for
sending information to the United States,
which is done directly by the financial
institutions.
In general financial institutions will have to collect and
remit information on many more accounts under the
CRS than under FATCA
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AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TAX CODE
(From Multilateral Instrument to Multilateral Agreement)
CHAPTER I.
COOPERATION BETWEEN TAX  
ADMINISTRATIONS
CHAPTER II.
COOPERATION BETWEEN TAX  
ADMINISTRATION AND  
TAXPAYERS
CHAPTER III.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION SYSTEMS  
ADR
IN TRANSBORDER TAX MATTERS
CHAPTER IV.
THE FIGHT AGAINST TAX FRAUD
AT THE INTERNATIONAL AND EU
LEVEL
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• TITLE I. COOPERATION BETWEEN TAX ADMINISTRATIONS
• Sec. 1. International and EU legal basis
• Sec. 2. Principles of administrative cooperation in tax matters
• Sec. 3. Concept and activities of administrative cooperation/mutual assistance
• Sec. 4.  Development of a general theory on good fiscal governance
• Sec. 5. Standard administrative procedures for exchange of tax information and other  
cooperation activities
• Sec. 6. The costs
• TITLE II. COOPERATION BETWEEN TAX ADMINISTRATION AND  
TAXPAYERS
SECTION 5. AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE  TAX
CODE
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• TITLE III. CONFLICT RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
• Sec. 1.Traditional systems to resolve transborder conflicts in tax  
matters (European Union Court, MAP). Statistics
• Sec. 2. Cross-border Alternative Tax Dispute Resolution systems
• Arbitration, ombudsman, mediation, tax agreements, …
• Proposal of the creation of the International Body to resolve trans  
border tax disputes which includes the different alternative dispute  
resolutions cited.
• TITLE IV. THE FIGHT AGAINST TAX FRAUD AT THE INTERNATIONAL  
AND EU LEVEL
• Statistics
• Indicators of international tax fraud. Sectors and causes
• Legal Sources: Soft Law and Hard Law. Regulatory instruments in the  fight 
against tax Fraud.
• The fight against the Tax Havens
• Others
AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TAX CODE
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The "Variable Geometry" of the Costs of Exchangeof
Information.
Different Approaches for Different Institutional Dynamics
Alessandro Turina  
EUDisCoop Research Project
Barcelona, 26 January 2017
Seite 53
The Problem of Administrative Costs
• The Explanatory Report to the MCMAA acknowledges that «although
a prosaic one, the problem of cost might be a serious obstacle to  
administrative assistance, as countries might desist from forwarding  
important requests for this reason»;
• The issue of the attribution and sharing of costs is thus one of the  
pillars of the sustainability of the architecture of international  
administrative co-operation in tax matters.
• Implicit question: Can the sharing of costs also play a role as an  
incentive to sustain co-operation besides complying with its  
fundamental “prosaic function”?
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The Costs of EOI and the Perspective of a
Developing Country
• Which costs are associated with exchange of information? ….The perspective of a
low income country (Uganda):
• (i) The creation and maintenance of exchange of information monitoring systems;
• (ii) Gathering requested information;
• (iii) Accessing relevant commercial websites;
• (iv) Training officers involved in information exchange;
• (v) Travel to obtain information;
• (vi) Where necessary, obtaining translating services; and
• (vii) In certain instances, non-recurrent costs such as those incurred to engage
external advisors.
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Cost Sharing: Blueprints derived from
International Recommendations
• The pattern governing the sharing of EOI costs is shaped after the
Commentary to Art. 9 of the OECD Model T.I.E.A. :
• «Costs that would be incurred in the ordinary course of administering the  
domestic tax laws of the requested State would normally be expected to  
be borne by the requested State when such costs are incurred for  
purposes of responding to a request for information.»
• Adjusting factors to be taken into consideration: the likely flow of  
information requests between the Contracting Parties; whether both  
Parties have income tax administrations; the capacity of each Party to  
obtain and provide information; the volume of information involved.
Seite 56
Cost Sharing: Blueprints derived from
International Recommendations (Cont’d)
• A variety of methods may be used to allocate costs between the  
Contracting Parties:
- case by case approach;
- scale of fees (function of the amount of work involved in responding to a
request).
In practice these criteria are not defined in actual agreements but typically  
left to MOUs between competent authorities.
This pattern is substantially replicated in the MCMAA (Art. 26) with
ordinary/extraordinary costs distinction as default rule even though it can
be superseded by bilateral MOUs arranging otherwise. According to the
explanatory notes “this follows the common practice, where a certain  
degree of reciprocity is assumed.”
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Cost Sharing: Blueprints derived from
International Recommendations (Cont’d)
• The Explanatory Report to the MCMAA further elaborates on  
exemplifications of «extraordinary costs»:
- costs incurred when a particular form of procedure has been used at
the
request of the applicant State;
- costs incurred by third parties from which the requested State 
has  obtained the information (for example bank
information);
- supplementary costs of experts, interpreters, or translators if needed, 
for  example for elucidating the case or translating accompanying 
documents or damages which the requested State has been obliged  
to pay to the taxpayer as a result of measures taken on the request of  
the applicant State.
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Cost Sharing: Survey of Current Practices
• Ordinary/extraordinary costs, how to draw a line?
Examples of extraordinary costs based on the Argentina/Uruguay minitreaty (Art. 8, 2013)
would include:
(a)reasonable fees charged by third parties for carrying out research;
(b) reasonable fees charged by third parties for copying documents;
(c) reasonable costs of engaging experts, interpreters, or translators;
(d) reasonable costs of conveying documents to the requesting party;
(e)reasonable litigation costs of the requested party in relation to a specific request  
for information; and
(f)reasonable costs for obtaining depositions or testimony. All requests for payment  
must be duly documented in written form.
• Typically these rules are defined in MOUs that are not publicly available, that is why the
Argentina-Uruguay “minitreaty” is so interesting and remains the only publicly available
positive source that concretely exemplifies this fundamental distinction.
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Cost Sharing and the ordinary/extraordinary
dichotomy
• Is the ordinary/extraordinary distinction really relevant?
• What is «ordinary» for a Country may be «extraordinary» for another  
country: this is due not only to disparity in economic development  
but also to the regulatory framework (e.g.,Argentina and Uruguay)
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Input and Output Exchange of Information
• Countries rarely release public statistics on the number of received
and/or forwarded requests.
• The only available statistics are those included in the GF Peer Review  
Reports.
• Are there «next exporters» and «net importers» of information?
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Embedding incentives in EOI cost sharing
rules
• Possibly an issue only relevant in case of structural asymmetries between the
involved parties (e.g. developed/developing; reliance on foreign source income;
«opaque» heritage)
• Possible alternatives: «cost + sharing» and «revenue sharing»?
• «Cost+ sharing» may underestimate the contribution of the Country supplying  
information
• Revenue sharing possibly departs from the common understanding of
administrative co-operation as the incentive rationale would be predominant.
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Cost + Sharing/Revenue Sharing: Policy
Perspectives
• What are then the possible alternative drivers for the «sharing»?
- The portion of recovered revenue that is shared with the
requesting state may be determined based on a combination of three  
factors:
1. How material the information gathered by the requested state ended up
being for the successful recovery in the requesting State;
2. The nature of the efforts undertaken by the requested state (e.g., time  
consumed, cost of opportunity, financial and human resources, etc);
3. The systemic asymmetries present between the requesting state and the
requested state.
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Different forms of EOI, different cost
structures?
• EOIR is fundamentally driven by variable costs, AEOI lies to a greater extent  
on overhead costs: the accrual of expenses is fundamentally divergent (ex  
post Vs ex ante). Who shall take care of these «lump sum» overhead costs 
associated with the CRS?
• Distinction between «information reporting» (fundamentally outsourced to  
financial intermediaries: co-operation costs are basically permuted into  
compliance costs for intermediaries) and «information exchange» (lying on  
competent authorities).
• Is the ordinary/extraordinary cost dychotomy still relevant in the light of
automatic exchange of information?
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Different forms of EOI, different cost
structures? General Criteria for Contribution
• In federal systems that adopt AEOI for domestic purposes, structural overhead
costs are typically sustained by the federal government (e.g. Brazil).
• In the current multilateral framework it is foreseen (Sec. 8 MCAA) that all  
signatories to the MCAA share equally, on an annual basis, the costs for the  
administration of the Agreement (managed by the Co-ordinating Body  
Secretariat).
• Waiver for developing countries (Art. 11 Rules of Procedure): Countries qualifying  
for the flat de minimis fee of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of  
Information for Tax Purposes (GDP < 35 bn USD) AND that have an annual GDP  
per capita that does not exceed the world average GDP per capita as published by  
the World Bank. If both conditions are met the signatory shall not be required to  
make an annual contribution
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Different forms of EOI, different cost structures?  
Relevance of the Ordinary/Extraordinary  
Dichotomy
• The Explanatory Report to the MCMAA mentions «bank information»
as an exemplification of «extraordinary costs». To which extent is this  
characterisation relevant for AEOI? Should it be considered an  
anachronism?
• Probably so, as information gathering concerning financial accounts  
has typically been outsourced to financial institutions. Are there  
hidden costs that still lie on tax administrations? Possibly monitoring  
costs and the need to adapt to existing global standards in order to  
minimise compliance costs for intermediaries.
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The EU Experience: Diverging Cost Attribution
Rules
• Art. 21(2) of Directive 2011/16/EU adopts a somewhat different guiding principle  
towards the sharing of costs: «Member States shall waive all claims for the  
reimbursement of expenses incurred in applying this Directive except, where  
appropriate, in respect of fees paid to experts.» This approach is justified by  
historical, political and practical reasons (greater symmetry and consistency).  
Could this approach be transposed to a global multilateral setting?
• Concern with the efficiency of information exchange? Based on Art. 8 (also  
subsequently amended) MS have been required to gather data «on the  
administrative and other relevant costs and benefits relating to exchanges that  
have taken place.» Will these findings shape future developments in the policy of  
administrative co-operation?
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION
a.turina@ibfd.org
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Is there a global fiscal constitution?
Dr. iur. Peter Hongler  
Lecturer University of Zurich
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• Increase in global tax legislation
• Influence on domestic law (shift in paradigm?)
• States are not anymore sovereign regarding their legislative power
• What is the value-based framework relevant for the international  
tax legislator?
• How is international tax governance regulated?
Why bother?
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• «Hot topic» in international law literature
• Existence of a global community?
• Specific constitutional-like documents? UN Charter?
• Is there an international agreement on certain values?
• Should we aim at a more integrated world comparable to a
domestic constitutional framework?
• «constitution by analogy approach»
An international law perspective
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members of a society
• Validity of a legal order is derived from the constitution
• Main organizational rules (checks and balances)
• Sign for the level of integration and centralization
• A goal of a constitution is often to increase, establish or promote
justice (and or legitimacy)
What is the purpose of a
c•oConlescttiointoufftuinodanmen?talrules and principles – agreed by
the
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• Organizational rules
• Substantive rules
Main elements of a constitution
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• International tax governance and checks and balances?
• Legislative body? (OECD, G20?)
• Executive body? (Global Forum, Inclusive Framework?)
• Judicial body? (missing?)
• Relation between states? Use of coercive measures?
• Who is competent to define minimum standards?
Organizational rules
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• Two (partly overlaping) categories of substantive rules:
• Protection of individual rights
• Protection of communitiy interests
Substantive rules
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• Protection of human rights
• Procedural rules
• Privacy rules
• Ability-to-pay principle?
• Equality principle?
• Prohibition of double taxation?
Protection of individual rights
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• Community interests are interests that can only be protected by  
international coordination and these interests are concerns of basically all  
states.
• Political agenda might be a sign for existing community interests
• The protection of these community interests might limit the de facto  
sovereignty of states
• At least two major elements can be identified:
• Global community interest to extinct tax evasion
• Global community interest to fight tax avoidance and base  
erosion
Protection of community interests
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Biased protection of community
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nt     protection of community interests
seems mainly or almost exclusively in a state’s
– or to be more precise, in revenue services’ –
interests, such as the protection of tax revenue  
by limiting cross-border tax evasion or by  
limiting tax avoidance opportunities.
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• Comparison to federal states (what are the deficiencies?)
• Reluctance is necessary not to use constitutionalism as a positive  
or negative goal
• There are imbalances in the system
• Missing judicial body?
• Biased community interests?
What can we learn from a
c•oAnnalystitcailttuootltioounndaersltadndethbealevteelo?f
integration
Taxpayers’ rights in cross-border tax  
procedures: the EU primary and  
secondary law framework
Pasquale Pistone, IBFD Academic Chairman  
Barcelona, 26 January 2017
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Outline
1. Introduction
2. The principles and EU primary law framework
3. How to involve the taxpayer in the settlement of  
cross-border tax disputes (Baker-Pistone ECTax  
Review 5-6/2016)?
4.CJEU: from Sabou to the pending Berlioz case  
5. COM (2016) 686 of 25.10.2016: the EU
Commission Proposal for an EU Tax Arbitration
Directive
6. Concluding remarks
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Ubi ius, ibi remedium
 Fundamental right of persons to protection against measures that may adversely  
affecting his personal sphere
Human rights, constitutional and supranational dimension
 Taxpayers are persons, but…children of a lesser God
Protection of taxpayers’ rights in purely domestic and cross-border scenarios
 Traditional vision: tax treaties as legal instruments to define the boundaries of tax  
sovereignty in mutual agreement
Implications: taxpayers have no rights connected with treaties
National procedural autonomy under European Union law subject to equivalence  
and effectiveness
1. Introduction
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Persons as holders of rights under EU law
Categories of rights: substantive, procedural and connected with the  
levying of penalties
Supranational dimension of fundamental principle is determined by
reference to EU principles and link with ECHR
Right to an effective legal remedy and implications of right to fair trial  
in administrative and judicial tax procedures
EU principles reflected in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (at
least Arts. 8, 17, 20, 21, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50)
EU Charter: implementation of EU law and ECHR as minimum standard
Interpretation by CJEU in tax matters: Belvedere Costruzioni, Åkeberg
Fransson, WebMindLicences, etc.
2. The principles and EU primary law framework
European Union law requires protection of  
fundamental rights of taxpayers
=> Member States may not ignore their issues in cross-border situations
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3. How to protect fundamental rights?
Baker-Pistone EC Tax Review 5-6/2016:
Involvement of taxpayers in cross-border tax  
procedures requires interventions in two main areas
1.Cross-border exchange of tax information => ex ante protection (right to be informed, judicial  
protection and access)
and
2.Settlement of cross-border tax disputes => two-tier model with involvement of taxpayer  
during MAPs and a wide range of solutions for preventing and settling disputes
Establishment of IFA-IBFD Observatory on Taxpayers’ Rights
© 2016 IBFD Seite 85
3. CJEU: From Sabou to the pending Berlioz case
• Sabou (C-276/10): right to defence in cross-border mutual assistance  
between tax authorities under EU directive
• No reference to EU Charter by national Court
• CJEU 22.10.2013: EU mutual assistance tax directive  
does not confer taxpayers the rights to be informed  
about a request for assistance, participate to formulate  
questions or to examine witness
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3. CJEU: From Sabou to the pending Berlioz case
• Berlioz (C-682/15 - pending): on the right to a legal remedy against request  
of information
• Luxembourg tax authorities were asked to supply precise  
information about recipient of dividends, such as PoEM,  
staff, contracts, shareholdings with names, addresses and  
capital owned (not supplied for not being foreseeably  
relevant), assets. Penalty for not supplying information
• National Court refers question also on Article 47 (effective
remedy)
• AG Wathelet 10.1.2017: Court must be able to verify  
legality of penalty on the basis of brief examination  
concerning the forseeable relevance
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CJEU: acknowledges problem of double taxation,
but excludes solution at interpretative level
Proposal for positive integration on double taxation
through harmonization (legal basis Art. 115 TFEU)
Implications: EU secondary law secures effective
protection of rights, thus also of taxpayers
Art. 12 acknowledges taxpayers’ rights to submit
relevant documents and be heard before Advisory
and Alternative Dispute Resolution Commissions: an
important progress!
Various measures secure effective protection
against inaction of tax authorities with support by  
national Courts
5. COM (2016) 686 – Proposal for EU Arbitration  
Directive
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EU law requires protection of fundamental rights and gives legal  
remedies for it
The protection of fundamental rights of persons, thus also of  
taxpayers, cannot be put under silence in the European Union
Cross-border mutual assistance in tax matters is a tool to secure
information, but must operate within the overall framework of  
legal standards of protection for taxpayers
Cross-border settlement of tax disputes may not be handled by
tax authorities without the involvement of taxpayers
Undesirable scenario> the Proposal is not approved by EU MSs
 Consequences: case-by-case patchwork of negative integration
Observatory on the practical protection of taxpayers’ rights and
shift towards a transparent EU standard of protection
Constructive dialogue with involvement of ombudsmen
6. Concluding remarks
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Muchas gracias
Moltes gràcies
p.pistone@ibfd.org
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Privacy Protection and Data Protection In
Automatic Exchange of Information
PHILIP BAKER QC
Field Court Tax Chambers  
3 Field Court, Gray’s Inn  
London WC1R 5EP
Visiting Professor, Oxford University  
e-mail: pb@fieldtax.com
FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Exchange of Information,  
Privacy and Data  
Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Broader Considerations and
Safeguards
pb@fieldtax.com
• AEoI is not immune from general law protections for privacy and data  
processing
FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
ECHR and ECFR
pb@fieldtax.com
• Article 8, ECHR
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right  
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic  
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of  
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
ECHR and ECFR
pb@fieldtax.com
• Art. 7 European Charter of Fundamental Rights
Respect for private and family life
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life,  
home and communications.”
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
ECHR and ECFR
pb@fieldtax.com
• X (Hardy-Spirlet) v Belgium (7th December 1982 – European  
Commission on Human Rights)
• Funke etc v France (appln 10828/84, 25th February 1993, European  
Court of Human Rights)
• Note: other rights potentially engaged
• Art 6 ECHR – right to a fair trial
• Art 14 ECHR – enjoyment of rights to be non-discriminatory
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
ECHR and ECFR
pb@fieldtax.com
Cases on cross-border exchange
•FS v. Germany (appln no 30128/96, 27 Nov 1996) – Art 8: exchange of
information under Mutual Assistance Directive
• Janyr v Czech Republic (appln no 42937/08, 31st Oct 2013) – Art 6:  
inability to secure exchange of information
• Jiří Sabou v Finanční ředitelství pro hlavní město Prahu (Case C-
276/12, 22nd  Oct 2013, CJEU)
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ECHR and ECFR
pb@fieldtax.com
Summary
• All gathering, retention and exchange of  
information is prima facie a breach of Art 8 ECHR /  
Art 7 ECFR
• The gathering and exchange can be justified if:
• In accordance with the law
• Necessary in a democratic society – a fair balance
• Not disproportionate
• Successful challenges will be rare
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Exchange of Information
and Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com Seite 99
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
• Article 16 Treaty on the Functioning of the  
EU
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning them.
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in  
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay  
down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with  
regard to the processing of personal data by Union  
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the  
Member States when carrying out activities which fall within  
the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free  
movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall  
be subject to the control of independent authorities.”
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
• Treaty on European Union (TEU): Article 39
“In accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  
Union and by way of derogation from paragraph 2 thereof, the Council shall  
adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the protection of individuals  
with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member States when  
carrying out activities which fall within the scope of this Chapter, and the rules  
relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be  
subject to the control of independent authorities.”
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FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
• Art 8, European Charter of Fundamental Rights
“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her.
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and  
on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some  
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the  
right of access to data which ahs been collected concerning  
him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.”
No ECHR equivalent – need to rely on right to privacy
and national legislation
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
• Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, 1981 (plus 2001 Protocol 181)
• 50 Ratifications / accessions
• Standard guarantees
• New Draft Modernised Convention, 2016
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
• Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October  
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal  
data and on the free movement of such data
• To be replaced by:
• Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27  
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of  
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive  
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
• Article 1 GDPR
“1. This Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons  
with regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free  
movement of personal data.
2. This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons
and in particular their right to the protection of personal data. “
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
GDPR
•Art 13 and 14 – right of data subject to know of collection of data from third party
•Art 15 – right of access and to rectify the data
•These rights may be modified for important economic and taxation reasons, when  
it is a necessary measure
•Art 82 – right to compensation for unlawful processing of data
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
GDPR
•Art 44 et seq – transfer of personal date to third countries
•Art 45:
“1. A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation  
may take place where the Commission has decided that the third country, a  
territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the  
international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection.
Such a transfer shall not require any specific authorisation.”
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (will become the European Data  
Protection Board)
•Letters of 21st June 2012 and 1st October 2012 with regard to FATCA and Directive  
95/46
“16.1 The WP29 shares the concerns expressed by some in relation to dual  
compliance with FATCA and the Directive. Without an appropriate legal basis  
justifying both sets of obligations imposed on European FFIs would result in the  
unlawful processing of personal data.”
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
•Letter of 18th September 2014 with regard to the OECD Common Reporting  
Standard (plus detailed Annex)
“The practical roll-out of CRS in Europe based on existing FATCA IT solutions  
currently lacks adequate data protection safeguards, notwithstanding the EU  
proposal to amend the Directive 2011/16/EU regarding mandatory automatic  
exchange of information in the field of taxation. This Directive – which could be  
considered as transposition of the US FATCA and CRS in EU law – so far falls short of  
data protection safeguards.”
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Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
• Statement of the WP29 on automatic inter-state exchanges of
personal data for tax purposes, 4th  February 2015
• 1. The automatic exchange of personal data for tax  
purposes should meet data protection requirements,  
namely the principles of purpose limitation and necessity
• 2. Member States that roll out the model of automatic  
massive storage and then forward this data for tax  
purposes, should be aware that they may incur increased  
(security) risks and liability under EU data protection laws
• 3. The WP29 confirms its approach on providing
additional guidance to increase data protection
safeguards in this area
Seite
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Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
•Guidelines for Member States on the criteria to ensure  
compliance with data protection requirements in the context of  
the automatic exchange of personal data for tax purposes  
(175/16/EN WP 234)
•Lists safeguards: e.g.
•Clear legal basis for exchange
•Purpose limitation
•Necessity and proportionality
•Data retention and destruction
•Data subject’s rights
Seite
111
FIELD COURT TAX CHAMBERS
Data Protection
pb@fieldtax.com
• How will this work in practice?
• What are the purposes for which information is  
exchanged?
• Can information be used for taxpayer profiling?
• For how long may data be retained?
• What about transmission of data to countries with  
inadequate data protection?
• What would happen if a country is denied data
because of data protection legislation?
• What happens when there is a leak?
Seite
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Note:
• Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (Cases C-293/12 and 594/12) – CJEU,  
Grand Chamber, 8th April 2014
• The retention of and access data relating to telephone usage
and internet access for anti-crime and anti-terrorist purposes
• Declared invalid Directive 2006/24/EC … on the retention of  
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of  
publicly available electronic communications services
• Directive was a disproportionate interference with the right to  
privacy inter alia because it required retention and access to  
data of entirely innocent persons, not under suspicion
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• Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (C-362/14)
• Transfer of Facebook data to the US
• Invalidity of Decision 2000/520 – the safe harbour
principles
• Duty of national authorities to keep data transfer to  
third states under review
• Bara (Romania) (C-201/14)
• Transfer of data between national authorities
• Duty to notify data subject of transfer of data
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•Tele2 Sverige AB (Cases C-203/15 and 695/15) –
•Judgment of 21st  December 2016
•General data retention obligation for electronic data
service suppliers
•Unlawful to require general retention of data from all  
subscribers
•Access by competent authorities to be limited to a)  
fighting serious crime; b) to be subject to prior review  
by a court or independent authority. Data to be  
retained in the EU
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• Possible / probable / certain tax challenges
Safeguards for developing countries  
in automatic exchange of  
information
Dr. Irma Johanna Mosquera
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Confidentiality
Article 26 OCDE: Confidentiality standard
 Other international instruments?
 MAC
 Instruments implementing automatic exchange of information: CRS and MCAA
 Domestic law e.g. Income Tax, Tax Administration Act
Privacy and data protection
 Right to privacy: International/ Regional Human Rights Conventions
Data privacy: CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic  
Processing of Personal Data 1981 (Additional Protocol of 8 Nov. 2001). Adopted by countries  
members of the CoE and a few third countries
 Domestic Law (e.g. Privacy Acts and data protection laws)
1. Instruments
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 Different rules regarding the standard of confidentiality
 Definition of taxpayer information subject to confidentiality rules: Broader, specific, or none (e.g. use  
of biometric information)
Access to Public Information: Asking for personal and business information including taxpayer  
information. Allowed insofar as the information does not constitute data processing (Satamedia Oy v.  
Finland)
Who has access to the data?  All tax officials?
 Commissions or administrative agencies (money laundering or corruption) and/or oversight  
authorities: Same duty of  confidentiality than tax officials or not?
 Third parties (with contracts with the tax administration e.g. software developers); What  
happens if duty is being breached?
2. Problems and solutions
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 Differences regarding the standard of privacy
Not clear how to protect privacy and data during exchange of  
information.
 Information (data) privacy:
Westin: Information privacy: subject has a claim to determine  
for themselves when, how and to what extent information  
about them is communicated to others?
 Cockfield: Tax information: Taxpayer’s income and other details  
about an individual personal circumstances is a particular  
sensitive form of personal information
Due to the rules dealing with Access to Public Information : risk  
using data for profiling which may not be protected under the data  
protection laws. Profile individual’s entity: beliefs, political alliances,  
personal behaviour
2. Problems and solutions
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 Differences regarding the standard of data protection
 Data protection laws
 EU: old rules vs. new rules
 What happens if the country does not have data protection laws or the data protection laws are  
obsolete? See ítem 3 below.
2. Problems and solutions
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Challenges
Implementation EOI and AEOI
Standard of confidentiality
Update of privacy and/or data protection laws
Initiatives and projects
3. Developing countries
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Implementation of standard of automatic exchange of information: early adopters, and late adopters  
(some developing countries)
Problems implementation standard of EoI on request not yet addressed. Most of developing countries are  
largely or partially compliant: peer review forum compliant ratings in Annual Report 2016
Review on the standard of confidentiality by the OECD (announced to be available by the end of 2016 –
no yet published) will affect developing countries since these countries may have more problems than  
developed countries.
.
3.1. Challenges developing countries
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 Differences regarding the standard of data protection
 Data protection laws
What happens if the country does not have data protection laws or the data protection laws are
obsolete?
 Sometimes data protection laws are difficult to be approved (e.g. Brazil)
 EU: old rules vs. new rules
 Some countries implement the data protection rules based on the EU rules but the  
adoption takes time, so will the non-EU countries adopt the new EU rules?
3.1. Challenges developing countries
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Developing countries: request, use and process tax information
Rules: training, sanctions and publicity of the sanctions
 Use appropriate software: Common Transmission System (encryption)
 Who has access to the software? Limited? And any mechanisms to monitor the access to thedocuments?
Prevention of leak or misuse of information (sanctions and remedies)
 Prevention of identity fraud and protection of business and personal information of taxpayer (incl.
biometric data)
.
3.1. Challenges developing countries
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 AEOI implementation projects with technical specific assistance, but resources limited, thus closer international collaboration  
with international (e.g. WB) and regional (tax) organizations (ATAF; CIAT) Role of the United Nations (observer)?
 The African initiative: engaging with African countries on tax transparency and EOI (October 2014)
 Enhance participation by African countries
 Ensure tools for EOI
 Build EOI capacity within African regional organisations
 Pilot projects: Partnering developed and developing countries
 More pilot projects needed?
 Open to all developing countries: why so limited participation?
 Usefulness – project assessment?
.
3.2. Initiatives and projects
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Non-binding
 The 2006 OECD Manual on InformationExchange
 The 1980 (updated in 2013) OECD Guidelines on the protection of Privacyand  
Transborder Flows of Personal Data
 The 2013 OECD Guide on the Protection of Confidentiality of Information
Exchanged for Tax purposes
 UN 1990 Guidelines on Privacy and DataProtection
 2005 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework
Binding
 CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic  
Processing of Personal Data 1981 and its Additional Protocol of 8 Nov. 2001.  
Adopted EU countries and Uruguay (2013); Mauritius and Senegal (2016).
.
4. Instruments with safeguards
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 Safeguards:
 EOI: the 2006 OECD general and legal aspects of exchange of information including  
confidentiality and tax secrecy (Section 13).
 Data protection: the 1980 Guidelines (with the 2013 update)
 collection limitation (ii) data quality principle; (iii) purpose specification principle;
(iv) use limitation principle; (v) security safeguards principle; (vi) openness  
principle; (vii) individual participation principle; and (viii) accountability principle.
 Confidentiality: the 2013 OECD Guide
 Best practices adopted by tax administrations to protect the tax confidentiality of  
the information exchanged.
 Recommendations to help tax authorities to ensure that confidential taxpayer 
information is being adequately safeguarded.
.
4. Instruments with safeguards
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Safeguards:
Privacy and Data Protection: The UN 1990 Guidelines
 Principles concerning the minimum guarantees that should be  
provided in national legislation. These principles are (i) lawfulness  
and fairness; (ii) accuracy; (iii) purpose-specification; (iv) interested-
person access; (v) non-discrimination; and (vi) security
 Also in OECD security and purpose specification
Not in OECD the principle of accuracy that provides for “the  
duty of data controllers to carry out regular checks of the  
quality of personal data.
This principle of accuracy can be useful when dealing with  
bulks of information as a result of automatic exchange of  
information.
.
4. Instruments with safeguards
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Safeguards:
Privacy: 2005 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
 Information privacy principles (i) preventing harm; (ii)providing  
notice; (iii) collection limitations; (iv) use of personal information; (v)  
mechanisms to exercise choice; (vi) integrity of personal  
information; (vii) security safeguards; (viii) access and correction; (ix)  
accountability.
 The framework is inspired on at that time OECD 1980 Guidelines on  
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data  
(para. 5 preamble). The content of the multilateral instrument also  
addresses some of the 1980 (updated in 2013) OECD Guidelines and  
the UN 1990 Guidelines.
4. Instruments with safeguards
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AEOI and safeguards require adequate protection. It is the responsibility of the  
tax administrations to ensure that the exchange of information has sufficient  
safeguards to protect the confidentiality and privacy of the information  
exchange
 To develop more partner projects which are properly assessed and  
adjusted in accordance to the needs of the countries
 Regional organizations also a relevant role e.g. Pacific Alliance,  
ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, African Union. To follow APEC example in  
privacy?
 To provide a multilateral framework that protects the automatic  
processing of personal data.
 To sign and ratify the CoE Convention for the Protection of  
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal  
Data 1981 and its Additional Protocol of 8 Nov. 2001.
• Also referred by the OECD and the MAC.
5. Recommendations
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Multilateral instrument with safeguards: The exchange of information will result  
in sending of data by the supplying State if the following cumulative conditions  
are being met:
 (i) similar data can be received from the receiving State (reciprocity) ;
(ii) the receiving State ensures adequate protection of confidentiality  
and data privacy that is guaranteed by a follow up by the supplying  
State to guarantee the respect of such confidentiality in the  
receiving State (security safeguards)  ;
(iii) the exchange is adequate, relevant  and not excessive in relation to
the purpose or purposes for which they are processed (purpose  
specification) ;
5. Recommendations
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International instrument with safeguards (cont.)
 The sending of data does not constitute an excessive burden for the tax  
administration that lacks of administrative capacity or technical knowledge to  
develop a secure electronic system to exchange data (proportionality).
 The data controller has the duty to carry out regular checks of the quality of  
personal data. (accuracy)
See also: Privacy and confidentiality in exchange of information procedures: some  
uncertainties, many issues, but few solutions. Filip Debelva and Dr. Irma Johanna Mosquera  
Valderrama. Forthcoming 2017.
5. Recommendations
Thank you for your attention!
Email: i.mosquera@ibfd.org 
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a) Tax Treaty EoI clauses based on Art. 26 OECD MTC (last version
issued on 15th July 2014)
b) Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) based on the so-
called Model agreement on exchange of information on tax matters, issued by the
OECD on 18th April 2002
c) Arts. 5-6-7 of the CoE/OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (as amended by the
2010 Protocol) enforced by 81 States
d) EU law  Directive no. 2011/16/EU (as amended by Directive no.
2014/107/EU); Council Regulation (EU) no. 904/2010; Council
Regulation (EC) No. 2073/2004 (administrative cooperation in the field
of excise duties); Council Regulation (EC) no. 515/97 (mutual
assistance on customs and agricultural matters); Convention on mutual
assistance and cooperation between customs administrations (so-called
Naples II).
Instruments for exchanging tax relevant  
information
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Art. 26 OECD MTC:
 The text does not expressly mention any taxpayer’s right
 we may imply taxpayers’ rights “in negative” from the counterlimits to the exchange
laid down by para. 3
 para. 5.3 of the 2014 Commentary to Art. 26 «The scope of exchange of information covers all
tax matters without prejudice to the general rules and legal provisions governing the rights of
defendants and witnesses in judicial proceedings»
 para. 10 of the 2014 Commentary to Art. 26  «Contracting States which are required, according
to their law, to observe data protection laws, may wish to include provisions in their bilateral conventions
concerning the protection of personal data exchanged. Data protection concerns the rights and
fundamental freedoms of an individual, and in particular, the right to privacy, with regard to automatic
processing of personal data»
 para. 12 of the 2014 Commentary to Art. 26  «the information MAY also be
communicated to the taxpayer»
 para. 14.1 of the 2014 Commentary to Art. 26  «Some countries’ laws include procedures
for notifying the person who provided the information and/or the taxpayer that is subject to the enquiry
prior to the supply of information. Such notification procedures may be an important aspect of the rights
provided under domestic law»
Which protection of taxpayers’ rights during
exchange of information procedures?
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Exchange of  information in the MAAT Convention:
 Preamble:
- No. 4 «Considering that a co-ordinated effort between States is necessary in order to foster all forms of
administrative assistance in matters concerning taxes of any kind whilst at the same time ensuring
adequate protection of the rights of taxpayers». Among the rights that deserve such
“adequate protection” also during tax administrative and criminal procedures, the 2011
version of the Commentary to the MAAT Convention indicates also «rights secured to persons
that may flow from applicable international agreements on human rights»;
- No. 5  «Recognising that international co-operation can play an important part in facilitating the
proper determination of  tax liabilities and in helping the taxpayer to secure his rights»;
- No. 6  «Considering that fundamental principles entitling every person to have his
rights and obligations determined in accordance with a proper legal procedure
should be recognised as applying to tax matters in all States and that States should
endeavour to protect the legitimate interests of taxpayers, including appropriate protection
against discrimination and double taxation»;
- No. 7  «Convinced therefore that States should carry out measures or supply information, having
regard to the necessity of protecting the confidentiality of information, and taking account
of international instruments for the protection of privacy and flows of personal data».
Which protection of taxpayers’ rights during
exchange of information procedures? (follows)
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Art. 21 (Protection of persons and limits to the obligation to provide
assistance) of the MAAT Convention: «1. Nothing in this
Convention shall affect the rights and safeguards
secured to persons by the laws or administrative practice of the
requested State. […]».
Which protection of taxpayers’ rights during
exchange of information procedures? (follows)
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Exchange of  information in Directive No. 2011/16/EU:
Preamble, no. 28  «This Directive respects the fundamental
rights and observes the principles which are recognised in
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union»
Art. 16  information may be used «in connection with judicial and
administrative proceedings that may involve penalties, initiated as a result of
infringements of tax law, without prejudice to the general rules and
provisions governing the rights of defendants and witnesses in
such proceedings»
Art. 25  «Member States shall, for the purpose of the correct application of
this Directive, restrict the scope of the obligations and rights provided» by the
Privacy Directive (Directive no. 95/46/EC)
Which protection of taxpayers’ rights during
exchange of information procedures? (follows)
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It is clear that the international community decided to stimulate as much as possible the
global circulation of tax relevant information, while totally ignored taxpayers’ rights,
which receive only through declarations of principle  the effective regulation is left to
domestic rules (harmonisation of exchange of information vs fragmented taxpayers’ right
protection).
From a comparative analysis, it emerges that the rights to an active involvement of
taxpayers during mutual administrative assistance procedures may be divided in three
categories:
a) NOTIFICATION RIGHTS allow the taxpayer to have knowledge of the requested of
information from another State;
b) CONSULTATION RIGHTS  allow the taxpayer to be heard before the final
transmission to the other State of the information requested, although the tax  
authorities of  the requested State remain absolutely free in their decision to exchange;
c) INTERVENTION RIGHTS  they represent the highest level of safeguard, since they
recognise to the taxpayer the right to check before a third party (i.e. an administrative
or judicial body) the legitimacy of the request of assistance and the correctness of
the
Taxpayers’ rights during exchange of information
procedures are fragmentarily regulated by national laws
information requested for the exchange.
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1) ITALY  no notification, consultation nor intervention rights;
2) FINLAND  no notification, consultation nor intervention rights;
3) BELGIUM  no notification, consultation nor intervention rights.
Nevertheless, if the request of assistance refers also to the third tax
years before, then the Belgian tax authorities shall notify to the taxpayer
the decision to transmit the information (only notification right);
4) POLAND  no notification, consultation nor intervention rights: only
notification right in case of mutual assistance in the recovery of foreign
tax claims;
5) SPAIN  in case of request for information made by another State,
the Spanish taxpayer may not be informed about the incoming request,
but may be aware of particular proceedings carried out by the Spanish
tax authorities in orrder to accomplish the transfer of information
Comparative remarks on taxpayers’ rights guaranteed (or
not) during incoming requests of information
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6) GERMANY  Full notification, consultation and intervention rights. Tax authorities
shall communicate to the taxpayer the incoming request of information, in order to
permit to block the administrative decision to exchange by obtaining from the judge an
injuction or a judgement;
7) SWEDEN  only notification right once the information requested is transmitted;
8) LUXEMBOURG:
a) Loi 31 March 2010. The tax authorities that receive a request of information, first
check that the latter are foreseeably relevant, then shall inform the taxpayer, who may
appeal the decision to transmit (within 30 days). If the information requested is
banking data, the notification is made to the financial institution, which shall inform
its client. In any case, after 30 days from the notification, the taxpayer may impugn
the decision to transmit information before the administrative judge (i.e. the Tribunal
Administratif);
b) Loi 25 November 2014. The owner of information (i.e. the taxpayer or the financial
institution) is obliged to make them available to the tax authorities (within 30 days),
the taxpayer (or the financial institution) will face an administrative penalty of
maximum € 250.000 (see Berlioz). Such penalty may be appealed regarding only its
amount.
Comparative remarks on taxpayers’ rights guaranteed (or
not) during incoming requests of information (follows)
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9) PORTUGAL  tax authorities shall notify the decision to transmit the
information requested and the taxpayer may appeal the decision within 30 days:
if the taxpayer gives convincing arguments, the judge is able to impede the
transmission;
10) HUNGARY  only notification rights;
11) SWITZERLAND  in case of incoming requests, the Federal Administration
of Contributions (FAC) makes a preliminary assessment of admissibility and
then notifies to the taxpayer (and to the financial institution owner of the
information) its decision to obtain and transmit such information, unless the
requesting State expressly ask to omit the notification in order to avoid that the
taxpayer “pollutes” the tax investigations. Once the FAC has obtained the
information and decided to transmit them, notifies its decision to the taxpayer,
who may appeal it within 30 days before the Federal Administrative Tribunal: a)
decision to block the transmission and impose to the FAC to close the case; or
b) authorise the transmission of  the information to the requesting State.
Comparative remarks on taxpayers’ rights guaranteed (or
not) during incoming requests of information (follows)
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12) UNITED KINGGOM  the HMRC is obliged to inform the taxpayer only of
an “instrument or decision” issued by another Member State and concerning taxes
covered by Directive no. 77/779/EEC.
Section 68, Finance (no. 2) Act 2005:
«(1) This section applies where, in accordance with Article 8a of the Mutual Assistance Directive,
the competent authority of another member State (“the applicant authority”) requests the
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to notify an instrument to the person to
whom the instrument is addressed.
(2) The Commissioners must take the necessary measures to notify the instrument to that person.
(3) The notification shall be given in accordance with the law applicable to notification of   similar
instruments in the part of  the United Kingdom in which it is given.
(4) The Commissioners must:
(a) inform the applicant authority immediately of  their response to the request, and
(b) confirm to the applicant authority, as soon as is reasonably practicable, the date on which  
the instrument was notified to the person concerned.
(5) The Commissioners may request additional information from the applicant authority   for the
purpose of  giving the notification.
[…]»
Comparative remarks on taxpayers’ rights guaranteed (or
not) during incoming requests of information (follows)
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1) POLAND  only notification rights;
2) AUSTRIA  only notifcation rights, if  the information object of  the request  
has banking nature;
3) LUXEMBOURG  no notification rights if  the tax authorities decide to make  
a request of information;
4) GERMANY  no notification rights. The taxpayer may request a  
precautionary order;
5) BELGIUM  tax authorities shall notify to the taxpayer their decision to
request information only if functional to determine the income of at least four
tax years subsequent to the one which the tax return refers. The taxpayer may
request a precautionary order;
6) SWEDEN  no notification, consultation nor intervention rights;
7) HUNGARY  no notification, consultation nor intervention rights;
8) ITALY  no notification, consultation nor intervention rights.
Comparative remarks on taxpayers’ rights guaranteed (or
not) during outgoing requests of information
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 FACT Mr. Sabou, a Czech footballer player, claimed in his Czech income tax return for
2004 expenditures incurred in other EU Member States with a view to a possible transfer
to another football club in the future. The Czech tax authorities had doubts and requested
information from the tax authorities of those Member States. Indeed, they received the
information that the clubs in question did not even know Mr. Sabou. Furthermore, there
were a number of invoices for services provided by a company in Hungary; upon requests
for information, the Hungarian authorities informed the Czech authorities that the
company was only an intermediary of a company established outside the EU and that only
an inspection in that non-Member State could produce reliable answers. Based on all this
information, the Czech authorities reassessed Mr. Sabou’s amount of tax. Mr. Sabou
appealed against the decision and claimed during the procedure before the
Supreme Administrative Court that the information obtained against him had
been acquired illegally, since he had not been informed of the requests for
information and not been able to take part neither in formulating the questions to
the foreign tax authorities nor to take part in the examination of witnesses in the
other Member States. In his view, this violated his rights of defense, also in
comparison to the rights he would have been granted in the Czech Republic.
CJEU, Grand Chamber, 22 October 2013,  
case C-276/12 Sabou
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 REASONING OF THE COURT:
a) para. 38  «the rights of the defence is a general principle of European Union law which
applies where the authorities are minded to adopt a measure which will adversely affect an
individual (see Sopropé, paragraph 36). In accordance with that principle, the addressees of
decisions which significantly affect their interests must therefore be placed in a position in which
they can effectively make known their views as regards the information on which the authorities
intend to base their decision (see, inter alia, C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others
[1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21, and Sopropé, paragraph 37)»;
b) paras. 44-45  «respect for the rights of the defence of the taxpayer does not require that the
taxpayer should take part in the request for information sent by the requesting Member State to
the requested Member State. Nor does it require that the taxpayer should be heard at the point
when inquiries, which may include the examination of witnesses, are carried out in the requested
Member State or before that Member State sends the information to the requesting Member
State. None the less, there is nothing to prevent a Member State from extending the right to be
heard to other parts of the investigation stage, by involving the taxpayer in various stages of the
gathering of information, in particular the examination of witnesses»
CJEU, Grand Chamber, 22 October 2013,  
case C-276/12 Sabou (follows)
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DECISION  EU law «must be interpreted as not
conferring on a taxpayer of a Member State either the right
to be informed of a request for assistance from
that Member State addressed to another Member State, in
particular in order to verify the information provided by that
taxpayer in his income tax return, or the right to take
part in formulating the request addressed to the
requested Member State, or the right to take part in
examinations of witnesses organised by the requested
Member State»
CJEU, Grand Chamber, 22 October 2013,  
case C-276/12 Sabou (follows)
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KREDIETBANK LUXEMBOURG (1994)  stolen microfiches containing bank information of
10.400 taxpayers, obtained by the Belgian tax authorities, which then transmitted them to the Dutch  
authorities according to Art. 4 of  Directive no. 77/799/EEC.
LIECHTENSTEIN LGT BANK (2008):
- in May 2006, the German secret services (Bundesnachrichtendienst) met in Strasbourg a former
employee of LGT Bank of Vaduz, Mr. Heinrich Kieber, and paid him € 5 million for a DVD
containing data and names of approximately 1400 taxpayers of various nationalities having
accounts opened in such bank;
- the stolen data contained in the DVD represented a serious infringement of Liechtenstein
criminal law, but the DVD was regularly purchased by Germany, subject to a withholding tax of €
377.198,00 and Mr. Kieber entered into the witness protection program;
- information started to circulate among EU tax authorities through “ordinary” mechanisms of
exchange of information.
FALCIANI LIST (2009):
- Hervé Falciani made a backup of  the data contained in the Geneve HSBC bank (approx. 127.000  
clients, among which Mexican narcos and terrorists linked to Al-Qa¯ `ida);
- the data were seized by the Public Prosecutor of  Nice (France) and, subsequently, transmitted to  
foreign Public Prosecutors and tax authorities.
“Pathological” aspects of exchange of information
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Belgian case law (on the Kredietbank Luxembourg case):
a) Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg te Brussel, Sec. XXXIII, 28 June 2002, no.
02/23379  «the documents in the administrative file (microfiche) do not carry any logo and
not even a reference to a bank, so that their origin is completely unclear. With good reason the
plaintiffs refer to case law that states a document of which the origin is unverifiable and of which
the administrative authorities admit that it is an analysis and a summary of unproduced
documents, do not constitute a known fact that can be used as a basis of a presumption of fact,
especially with regard to determining the amount of the sums placed on a Luxembourg bank
account»;
b) Correctionele Rechtbank van het arrondissement Hasselt, Sec. XVIII, 30
April 2003, no. 78.97.1357-00  «the necessary documents for verification of the regularity
of the submitted microfiche as evidence, and the prosecutor of the State does not deny the claim
of the accused that the information was obtained unlawfully»;
c) Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg te Brussel, Sec. XLIX (criminal), 8
December 2009, no. 78.97.2825-96  the information contained in the
microfiches was obtained unlawfully and, therefore, cannot be used by Belgian tax
authorities.
The approach of domestic Courts on unlawfully obtained  
information received by other tax authorities
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Dutch case law (on the Kredietbank Luxembourg case):
a) Gerechtshof Amsterdam, Sec. IV (tax), 18 January 2006, no. 03/04509
(LJN n. AU9845)  information from the Kredietbank Luxemburg has
been transmitted from the Belgian Government according to a specific EU
instrument (i.e. Directive no. 77/799/EEC) and it does not have relevance
what happened before;
b) Hoge Raad, Criminal Chamber, 15 November 2006, no. 023245/05
(LJN n. AX7471)  confirmed this approach regarding a tax violation
having criminal relevance. In the same sense, see Rechtbank Alkmaar,
Criminal Section, 12 March 2004, no. 14.060137-02 (LJN n. AO5509);
Rechtbank Groningen, Criminal Section, 20 October 2003, no.
18/076010-01 (LJN n. AM1882); Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, Criminal
Section, 17 November 2004, no. 09/755055-02 (LJN n. AR5793);
c) Hoge Raad, Tax Chamber, 21 March 2008, no. 43050 (LJN n. BA8179)
 confirmed this approach regarding a tax violation having merely
administrative relevance.
The approach of domestic Courts on unlawfully obtained  
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German case law (on the Liechtenstein case):
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 9  
November 2010, case n. 2101/09:
a) according to criminal procedure rules German law, the
prohibition to use evidence unlawfully obtained applies only in
case of «serious, intentional or arbitrary violations, which imply a planned
or systematic infringement of rights constitutionally guaranteed»;
b) evidence obtained by «privates – and not by a German authority –
shall be considered usable, also if they have been obtained through the
commission of a crime».
The approach of domestic Courts on unlawfully obtained  
information received by other tax authorities (follows)
155
Italian case law (on the Liechtenstein case):
 Tax Court of First Instance of Mantua, Sec. I, 27 May 2010, no. 137  «In case of
exchange of information between Member States of the European Union, according to Directive no.
77/799/EEC, the Italian tax authorities shall attach to the tax assessment the
documents concerning the modalities through which it obtained information on
the assessed taxpayer. Lacking the attached documents on exchange of information with a foreign
tax authority, the tax assessment shall be considered invalid, since, although Art. 7 of Law no.
212/2000 – providing that all the acts of the Italian tax authority shall be grounded – does not provide
any form of invalidity, the judge is nevertheless obliged to declare it invalid, being this a peremptory rule of
law»;
 Tax Court of First Instance of Milan, Sec. XL, 15 December 2009, no. 367  «In
compliance with the principle of transparency and clarity that characterize the administrative activity, tax
assessments not attaching the documents obtained through exchange of information with a foreign tax
authority are considered invalid, since that fulfillment is a burden of proof for the Italian tax authority.
Consequently, in absence of these documents attached in official copy or in original,
the mere “qualified report” of income owned abroad obtained by a foreign tax
authority, which does not identify the source and the amount, is not a sufficient
presumption to support a tax assessment, since it would impose on the taxpayer a
disproportionate burden of proof».
The approach of domestic Courts on unlawfully obtained  
information received by other tax authorities (follows)
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Italian case law (on the Falciani list):
Tax Court of First Instance of Genoa, Sec. IV, 5 June 2012, no.
193  the exchange of information concerning data contained in the
Falciani list is able to successfully ground an Italian tax assessment,
since the information has been transmitted by a foreign tax authority:
the formally correct exchange of information is able to “heal” the ab
origine crime;
 In the same sense, see Tax Court of First Instance of Lucca, Sec.
IV, 18 July 2012, no. 103; Tax Court of First Instance of Treviso,
Sec. V, 28 June 2012, no. 59; Tax Court of First Instance of
Treviso, Sec. I, 5 June 2012, no. 64;
 Supreme Court, Tax Chamber, orders of 28 April 2015, no. 8605
and no. 8606  the data contained in the Falciani list may successfully
ground a tax assessment.
The approach of domestic Courts on unlawfully obtained  
information received by other tax authorities (follows)
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French case law (on the Falciani list):
Cour d’Appel de Paris, Pôle 5 – Chambre 7, ordonnance 8
February 2011  information that grounded the tax assessment
was ab origine stolen, therefore «obtenues par la commission d’une
infraction pénale». And, in any case, «la transmission de ces données par le
Procurer de la République de Nice à la DNEF au titre de l’article L 101 du
LPF est irrégulière puisque cet article vise la communication par l’autorité
judiciaire à l’administration des finances de toute indication qu’elle peut
recueillir de nature à faire présumer une fraude en matière fiscale»;
Cour de Cassation, Chambre Commerciale, Financère et
Économique, 31 January 2012, no. 141 (case no. P 11-13.097) 
confirmed such approach.
The approach of domestic Courts on unlawfully obtained  
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In 2012, the European Commission has drawn a roadmap aimed at
achieving efficiency and effectiveness in the enforcement of  taxes (An  
Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax
evasion, COM(2012) 722 final, Bruxelles, 6 December 2012),
composed by 34 steps, one of which is the creation of “a European
taxpayer’s code”  «in order to improve tax compliance, the Commission will
compile good administrative practices in Member States to develop a taxpayers’
code setting out best practices for enhancing cooperation, trust and confidence
between tax administrations and taxpayers, for ensuring greater transparency on the
rights and obligations of taxpayers and encouraging a service-oriented approach.
[…]
By improving relations between taxpayers and tax administrations, enhancing
transparency of tax rules, reducing the risk of mistakes with potentially severe
consequences for taxpayers and encouraging tax compliance, encouraging Member
States’ administrations to apply a taxpayers’ code will help to contribute
to more effective tax collection»
Future perspective on taxpayers’ rights protection during
mutual administrative assistance
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The Guidelines on the “European taxpayer’s code” have been published on 24 November 2016.
Although nothing specifically referable to the exchange of information is contained in such
document, certain principles may be applicable in this respect. For example, the Gudelines provide
that taxpayers can expect:
a) at the beginning of  or when notified of  an audit process, to ask or be informed about their  
rights and obligations;
b) tax administrations to communicate to them the character of  the tax audit to be informed if  
the
tax administrations review or adapt the overall scope of  an audit;
c) to be able to give information in order to explain and better clarify their position, in accordance  
with law;
d) in general, to have the opportunity to discuss the results of  the audit before the final report;
e) tax administrations to communicate clearly to them the conclusions and consequences of a tax
audit;
f) tax administrations to inform them about the possibility to apply for a review of the 
consequences of  a tax audit
 These general indications, transported in the field of  exchange of  information procedures,  may
imply the need that the taxpayer deserves notification, consultation and intervention rights.
Future perspective on taxpayers’ rights protection during
mutual administrative assistance (follows)
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Nowadays, the international enforcement of taxpayers’ rights –
being the regulation fragmented among national legislations – may find
an international “umbrella” in the field of human rights laid
down in the ECHR and in other instruments, such as the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
In this respect, it is actually pending before the CJEU a request for a
preliminary  
Luxembourg,
remark lodged by the Cour administrative
of   which is one of the few
jurisdictionsrecognisingimportant rights to taxpayers subj t to ternational exchange of
information  Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour
administrative (Luxembourg) lodged on 18 December 2015 – Berlioz
Investment Fund S.A. v Directeur de l’Administration des Contributions
Directes (Case C-682/15)
The pending Berlioz Investment case
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 A French company decided to pay a dividend to its Luxembourgish parent company, the Berlioz Investment
Fund.
 The French company somehow escaped the withholding tax at source on the dividend paid.
 French tax authorities pointed out that, in order to make the dividend exempt from tax, French law sets down
a number of requirements that need to be satisfied. Nevertheless, considering that the French controlled
company did not provide any information, the French tax officers could not tell if the requirements of French
law were met.
 Request to the Luxembourgish tax authorities concerning the parent company that received the dividend and
the percentages of the shares
 According to the post-2014 Luxembourgish legislation, tax authorities wrote to Berlioz requesting its director
to provide the information requested by France.
 The director of Berlioz cordially declined to provide such information, remarking that: a) the principle of
non-taxation at source was an “EU legal creature” identified by the CJEU from decision in Case 170/05
Denkavit onward; b) that information concerning names and addresses of subjects that received the dividend
and the percentages of their shareholdings, were irrelevant to any investigation by the French tax authorities.
 The response of the Luxembourgish tax authorities was to apologise and then slap a ‘failure to cooperate’
penalty on the Berlioz Investment Fund of  € 250.000
 Following an appeal made by Berlioz, the Luxembourgish administrative court of first instance lowered the
fine to € 150.000
 Nevertheless, such decision did not take position on the alleged violation of EU law nor whether the
information requested to the taxpayer was effectively relevant to the purpose of the French tax authorities’
investigation
The pending Berlioz Investment case (follows)
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The six questions referred to the Court:
1) Is a Member State implementing EU law and thus rendering the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union] applicable in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof in a situation such as that in the main proceedings when it
imposes an administrative pecuniary penalty on a person on account of that person’s alleged failure to fulfil his
obligations to cooperate pursuant to an order requiring him to provide information (‘information order’) made by the
competent national authority of that State under national procedural rules introduced for that purpose, in the context of
that Member State’s execution, in its capacity as the requested State, of a request for exchange of information from
another Member State that is based by the latter State, inter alia, on the provisions of Directive 2011/16 on the exchange
of information on request?
2) In the event that it is established that the Charter is applicable to the present case, can a person rely on Article 47 of the
Charter if he takes the view that the aforementioned administrative pecuniary penalty imposed on him is designed
to place him under an obligation to provide information in the context of the execution, by the competent
authority of the requested Member State of which he is a resident, of a request for information from another
Member State for which there is no justification as regards the actual fiscal aim, there being therefore no
legitimate aim in the present case, and which is intended to obtain information that has no foreseeable relevance to the
tax case concerned?
3) In the event that it is established that the Charter is applicable to the present case, does the right to an effective remedy
and to a fair trial as laid down by Article 47 of the Charter require – without the possibility of restrictions being
imposed under Article 52(1) of the Charter – that the competent national court must have unlimited jurisdiction
and accordingly the power to review, at least as a result of an objection, the validity of an information order
made by the competent authority of a Member State in the execution of a request for exchange of information
submitted by the competent authority of another Member State, inter alia, on the basis of Directive 2011/16 in an action
brought by the third party holder of the information, to whom that information order is addressed, such action being
directed against a decision imposing an administrative pecuniary penalty for that person’s alleged failure to fulfil his
The pending Berlioz Investment case (follows)
obligation to cooperate in the context of  the execution of  that
request? 163Seite
163
4) In the event that it is established that the Charter is applicable to the present case, are Articles 1(1) and 5 of Directive
2011/16, in the light, on the one hand, of the parallels with the standard of foreseeable relevance arising out of the
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and, on the other, of the principle of sincere cooperation laid
down in Article 4 TEU, together forming the objective of Directive 2011/16, to be interpreted as meaning that the
foreseeable relevance, in relation to the tax case referred to and to the stated fiscal purpose, of the information sought
by one Member State from another Member State constitutes a condition which the request for information
must satisfy in order to trigger an obligation on the part of the competent authority of the requested Member
State to act on that request, and in order to justify an information order issued to a third party by that authority?
5) In the event that it is established that the Charter is applicable to the present case, are the provisions of Article 1(1) in
conjunction with Article 5 of Directive 2011/16, and Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as precluding a legal
provision of a Member State that generally limits the examination by its competent national authority, acting as
the authority of the requested State, of the validity of a request for information to a review as to whether the
request is in order, and as requiring a national court seised of court proceedings such as those described in the third
question above to verify, in the context of those court proceedings, that the condition of foreseeable relevance of the
information requested has been satisfied in all its aspects regarding the links to the particular tax case in question, the
stated fiscal purpose and compliance with Article 17 of Directive 2011/16?
6) In the event that it is established that the Charter is applicable to the present case, does the second paragraph of Article
47 of the Charter preclude a legal provision of a Member State that precludes a request for information made by the
competent authority of another Member State from being submitted to the competent national court of the requested
State in court proceedings before it such as those described in the third question above; and does it require that document
to be produced to the competent national court and access to it to be granted to the third party holding the information,
or, indeed, that document to be produced to the national court without access to it being granted to the third party
holding the information, owing to the confidential nature of that document, provided that any difficulties caused to the
third party by a limitation on his rights are sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the competent
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 Procedural rules providing mutual assistance have become the real “engine” for making national  
substantive tax provisions effective abroad
 The positive attempts towards global fiscal transparency and against the abuse of “tax havens”
are partially frustrated by new waves of bilateralism:
a) “Rubik” Agreements;
b) Brexit;
c) Donald Trump election (e.g. no TTP agreement)
d) growing populistic and Euro-skeptic movements, which prefer bilateral rather than
multilateral instruments
 Taxpayers’ rights protection still remain too vague  economic globalisation has so far not been  
paralleled by a global recognition of   (tax) human rights
a) The “commerce” of  unlawfully obtained lists containing potential tax evaders is expression  
of:
• the failure of   legal instruments for taxcooperation;
• the infringement of taxpayers’ rights, since information illegally collected abroad are
“washed”, exchanged and used for tax assessment purposes (fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine?)
b) Italian Supreme Court no. 38753/2012, no. 8605/2015 and no. 8606/2015  the data  
contained in the Falciani list may successfully ground a tax assessment;
c) Italian Supreme Administrative Court no. 6472/2011  the taxpayer has no right, during the
tax audit, to have access to the Falciani list, since it is covered by the tax investigation secrecy
Conclusive remarks
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“Fishing expeditions” and rights of tax payers as
regards mutual administrative assistance on tax
matters
Luis Viñuales Sebastián
Barcelona, 26 de enero de 2017
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1. International context; OECD standards on transparency and
exchange of information
2. Prohibition of random and speculative requests under article26  
of the OECD Model TaxConvention
3. A fine line between fishing expeditions and group requests
4. Tax payers rights and safeguards under national laws and  
exceptions to prior notification under the OCDE Multilateral  
Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
5. The debatable use of conventions on administrative cooperation
to fight tax crimes
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1. International context; OECD standards on 
transparency and exchange of
information
• Automatic exchange of information; Common Reporting Standard
(CRS) 2014
(i) 2017 information to be exchanged in 2018
(ii) Low value accounts and Entity accounts
• Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR); Terms of Reference
2016 (ToR)
• The Global Forum OECD
(i) monitoring of compliance by means of peer reviews
(ii) black lists of non-cooperative jurisdictions
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1. International context; OECD standards on transparency  
and exchange of information
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2. Prohibition of random and speculative requests 
under article 26 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention
OECD Commentary on art. 26
• No obligation of the requested State to provide information in
response to requests that are “fishing expeditions”, i.e. speculative
requests that have no apparent nexus to an open inquiry or
investigation
• The standard of “foreseeable relevance” can be met both in cases
dealing with:
(i) one taxpayer (whether identified by name or otherwise); or
(ii) several taxpayers (whether identified by name or otherwise)
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3. A fine line between fishing expeditions and 
group requests
• OECD Commentary on art. 26
• Where the request relates to a group of taxpayers not individually
identified, it will often be more difficult to establish that the request is
not a fishing expedition.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Detailed description of the group
Facts, circumstances, applicable law
Reasons to believe non-compliance with the law
• A group request that merely describes the provision of financial
services to non-residents and mentions the possibility of non-
compliance by the non-resident customers does not meet the
standard of foreseeable relevance.
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4. Tax payers rights and safeguards - OCDE 
Multilateral Convention on 
administrative assistance
• Article 21 – Protection of persons and limits to the obligation to  
provide assistance
1 Nothing in this Convention shall affect the rights and safeguards secured to  
persons by the laws or administrative practice of the requested State.
• Right of appeal and notification procedures. Exceptions:
(i) information request is of a very urgent nature; or
(ii) the notification is likely to undermine the chance of success of the
investigation
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5. The debatable use of conventions on  
administrative cooperation to fight tax crimes
• Multilateral OECD. Commentary.
(ii)
(i) 10. The present Convention accordingly covers administrative assistance in all
tax matters without prejudice to the general rules and legal provisions
governing the rights of defendants and witnesses in judicial proceedings.
Exchange of information for criminal tax matters can also be based on
bilateral or multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance (to the extent they
also apply to tax crimes), as well as on domestic legislation for the granting
of such assistance.
279. Paragraph 7 states that, notwithstanding paragraph 6, for tax matters
involving intentional conduct which is liable to prosecution under the criminal
laws of the applicant Party, the provisions of this Convention, as amended by
the 2010 Protocol, shall have effect from the date of their entry into force in
respect of a Party in relation to earlier taxable periods or charges to tax.”
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5. The debatable use of conventions on  
administrative cooperation to fight tax crimes
• European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters  
(1959)
(i) Mutual assistance in proceedings in respect of offences the punishment of
which, at the time of the request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of
the judicial authorities of the requesting Party (art. 1).
(ii) Assistance may be refused in cases of fiscal offences (art. 2).
(iii) Reservations and dual incrimination as condition precedents for
international cooperation (art. 23).
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5. The debatable use of conventions on  
administrative cooperation to fight tax crimes
• Privilege against self-incrimination
(i) European Convention on Human Rights. Art.6.
Right of silence/freedom against self incrimination in tax investigations. JB v.  
Switzerland (2001); Chambaz v. Switzerland (2012).
(ii) OECD Commentary on art. 26 Model Tax Convention
A requested State may, therefore, decline to provide information if the
requesting State would have been precluded by its own self-incrimination
rules from obtaining the information under similar circumstances.
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